United spent last week making fun of Delta's Wi-Fi and offering to match its customers' status.

“Don't keep buffering: switch to United.”

Elon Musk had been attacking Delta's decision to use Amazon Leo for its next satellite internet system. United, which already has Starlink on hundreds of aircraft, saw an opening. On October 1, it invited Delta elites to try United for 90 days, with a path to keep their matched status into January 2028.

I think United is now challenging Delta's lead by doing what helped Delta pull ahead in the first place: investing in the network, the product, the technology, and the brand.

Delta still makes the most money, but its product and international expansion are starting to stagnate. Last week's Starlink fight made the difference in pace public, and United is using it to go after Delta's most loyal customers.

I've been writing about Delta's slow pace and the Starlink fight. Delta used to be the airline making its rivals look complacent.

Delta filed for bankruptcy in 2005. Ten years later, it reported $7.8 billion in operating income and a 19.2% operating margin. United made $5.2 billion at a 13.6% margin. By 2019, Delta was still earning about 14 cents in operating profit for every dollar of revenue, against United's 10 cents.

The turnaround started under Gerald Grinstein, who led Delta through bankruptcy. Glen Hauenstein helped redirect its network toward international flying. Richard Anderson became CEO in 2007 and agreed to buy Northwest in 2008, bringing Detroit, Minneapolis, and a much bigger Pacific network into Delta. Ed Bastian, then Delta's president, helped run the business before succeeding Anderson in 2016.

New York, Los Angeles, Boston, and Seattle were the big bets. These were valuable business markets with plenty of competition, and Delta built much stronger positions in all four. New York already had American and Continental. Seattle was Alaska's home. Boston was becoming JetBlue's city. LAX had several airlines fighting for the same customers.

At JFK, the expansion began while Delta was still in bankruptcy. Its 2006 international push included Budapest, Dublin, Manchester, and Kyiv. It moved aircraft into international flying rather than waiting to buy a new fleet. July schedules show international destinations rising from 19 in 2005 to 46 in 2008.

Delta added the domestic schedule at LaGuardia to go with it. In the 2011 slot swap with US Airways, it acquired 132 slot pairs, traded away 42 at Reagan National, and paid $67 million, with divestitures required by regulators. A New York customer could increasingly use Delta for both a short business trip and a flight overseas.

London was harder. In December 2012, Delta agreed to buy Singapore Airlines' 49% stake in Virgin Atlantic for $360 million. The planned joint venture combined nine daily round trips between Heathrow and JFK or Newark. Virgin supplied Heathrow access, a recognizable premium brand, and a schedule Delta could coordinate with its own. Air France-KLM already gave it depth elsewhere in Europe.

In Seattle, Delta built domestic connections to feed an international gateway, putting it into direct competition with Alaska. In Los Angeles, it built up its own schedule and used overseas partners to make the network more useful. Those partnerships mattered: a customer could earn status on Delta while traveling beyond the cities Delta served itself. Its 2015 investments included $450 million for a stake in China Eastern, alongside relationships with Aeroméxico and GOL.

In Boston, Delta opened Terminal A in 2005, then surrendered gates after bankruptcy left it with more space than it could use. It later rebuilt the schedule, reclaimed terminal space, added international flights, and declared Boston a hub in 2019.

In 2019, JetBlue had 29% of Logan's passengers and Delta had 19.5%. By 2024, Massport's figures put Delta at 25.7% and JetBlue at 25%. Delta had closed a nearly ten-point gap and become the larger airline by passengers.

Alaska remained strong in Seattle, and LAX was fiercely contested. Delta had nevertheless become a credible choice for business travelers in all four markets.

By April 2014, every business-class seat on Delta's overseas widebodies converted to a flat bed and had direct aisle access. United had installed flat beds earlier, but still had older 2-2-2 and even 2-4-2 business-class cabins.

In 2013, Delta introduced Westin bedding, Tumi amenity kits, and Malin+Goetz products. Joanne Smith's in-flight team offered an express meal on overnight flights, adjusted the lighting for sleep, and reduced announcements. Passengers could finish dinner quickly and sleep. Delta also replaced JFK’s Terminal 3 with an expanded Terminal 4 that year, adding nine international gates.

Under Bastian, Delta introduced Delta One Suites, with a sliding door at each seat.

Anderson was willing to buy or lease aircraft other airlines didn't want. Delta's 2013 filing laid out a plan to lease 88 Boeing 717s from Southwest. Each had 110 seats, including 12 in first class. They helped replace small regional jets with aircraft that could carry more passengers and offer a better cabin. Delta also ordered 100 new 737-900ERs. It chose different aircraft for different jobs rather than insisting that every addition be brand new.

In 2012, Anderson bought an oil refinery. Delta’s Monroe Energy subsidiary took over the Trainer facility near Philadelphia to produce jet fuel for its Northeast operation. A refinery also makes gasoline and diesel, so Delta arranged to trade those products with Phillips 66 and BP for more jet fuel.

The refinery lost $116 million in 2013. Delta argued that increasing the supply of jet fuel also reduced what the airline paid for fuel.

Wieden+Kennedy's Keep Climbing campaign launched in New York in September 2010. The early black-and-white spot showed employees at work. Its promise was: “We're not just building a bigger airline, we're building a better one.”

In February 2017, Delta introduced Viola Davis as its voice with “4 A.M.” Shot in New York, Shanghai, Mexico City, and Los Angeles, the film followed travelers and Delta employees getting up before dawn. An early flight became part of an ambitious person’s life: the important meeting, the opportunity overseas, the reason to get out of bed.

Those ads did a lot to make Delta feel premium. The next-generation seats and Westin bedding supplied the product; the films made flying Delta feel like a choice someone successful would make.

Tim Mapes, Delta’s chief marketer from 2008, helped build that identity over years. In a 2023 interview, he described Keep Climbing as “never being satisfied with the status quo.” That promise makes Delta’s slower pace today particularly conspicuous.

SkyMiles offered concrete reasons to keep choosing Delta: complimentary upgrades, miles that didn’t expire, and rollover qualifying miles, which gave frequent flyers a head start on the next year’s status. A traveler who had already earned status could keep building toward the following year instead of starting from zero.

Then Delta changed who earned the most miles. Starting in 2015, ticket spending replaced distance flown: general members earned five miles per eligible dollar, while Diamond members earned eleven. A $1,000 fare earned a Diamond 11,000 miles before any credit-card bonus. Delta was giving its biggest spenders a stronger reason to book again.

American Express bought miles from Delta and awarded them to cardholders for their spending. The cardholder got miles toward a trip; Delta got paid before that trip happened. In 2008, Amex advanced Delta $1 billion through a SkyMiles purchase, supplying cash during the financial crisis.

Delta became an airline business travelers could depend on. Anderson described expanding overnight maintenance coverage to roughly 40–45% of the fleet. Mechanics had more chances to fix small problems before the aircraft was needed for its morning flight.

In 2015, Delta reported 161 days without a single mainline cancellation, up 69% from 2014. It operated 99.6% of its scheduled mainline flights. Corporate ticket volume rose 4% that year. For someone traveling to a meeting, that reliability was a reason to pay more.

Employees shared in the financial result. Delta recorded $1.49 billion in profit-sharing expense for 2015. Keeping the airline running well could mean a bigger check for the people doing the work.

United's 2010 merger with Continental should have made it a formidable rival. Newark, Chicago, Houston, San Francisco, Washington, Denver, and Los Angeles gave the combined airline an extraordinary starting position.

Continental's Jeff Smisek became CEO. My impression of those years is an airline preoccupied with integrating the companies and cutting costs, while Delta was giving people more reasons to choose it.

Bloomberg's reporting on the merger described outsourced airport jobs and front-line employees frustrated with management. Transportation analyst Vicki Bryan argued that Smisek's aloofness made his team slow to confront problems. The troubled 2012 systems conversion became another source of delays and customer complaints.

United did spend on aircraft and seats, and it did advertise. In September 2013, it brought back “Fly the Friendly Skies,” with Gershwin's Rhapsody in Blue and ads showing flat beds and Economy Plus.

Passengers described a very different airline. In comments on the campaign, Jason Steele recalled his wife being refused a pillow in first class on an overnight Maui–Denver flight. Another passenger described indifferent service in BusinessFirst.

Smisek resigned in September 2015 during an investigation into a flight restored for the Port Authority chairman's convenience. Bloomberg reported celebrations in United's Newark crew lounge.

Oscar Muñoz took over in September 2015 and started visiting employees. A flight attendant told him: “I'm just so tired of having to tell people I'm sorry.”

Muñoz negotiated higher pay and halted some airport outsourcing. He also switched United’s coffee to illy, a small but tangible signal that quality and the onboard product mattered again.

In business class, the bigger change was Polaris. In June 2016, Muñoz unveiled a new business-class seat with direct aisle access, dedicated lounges, Saks Fifth Avenue bedding, and pajamas on longer flights. United was finally giving its international network a product it could build a premium brand around.

It took a painfully long time to deliver. Brian Sumers reported in February 2018 that fewer than 20 of United's more than 150 widebodies had the new seats, and only one Polaris lounge was open. United was selling Polaris well before most passengers could get the full experience.

Meanwhile, in April 2017, passengers filmed David Dao being forcibly dragged down the aisle of a United Express plane. The video went around the world. United's treatment of its customers had become an international scandal, less than two years into Muñoz's effort to rebuild trust.

Muñoz also brought Scott Kirby over from American as president in 2016. Kirby became CEO in 2020. Muñoz had begun repairing the service and employee relationships. Kirby would commit to a much larger expansion of the fleet and product.

In June 2021, United ordered 270 Boeing and Airbus aircraft and announced United Next. Seatback screens, larger bins, and more premium seats would become standard across its mainline narrowbody cabins. Many 50-seat regional jets would give way to larger aircraft.

By March 2026, United said 70 percent of its narrowbody retrofit was complete. Its new 787 configuration adds 30 Polaris and Premium Plus seats compared with the previous layout, even as the total passenger count falls.

Kirby and commercial chief Andrew Nocella have also been aggressive and creative about where to send the planes. United's ten new international cities announced for 2027 include Ibiza, Valencia, Ljubljana, and Catania. An A321XLR with 20 Polaris and 12 Premium Plus seats gives it a way to try Atlantic routes that don't need a large 787.

United's route announcements have become a much bigger production. This year it made a 13-minute destination-guessing show. I would never have expected an airline route announcement to need a reality show. But I watched it.

The technology has become another reason to choose it. Its app can show the walk to a connecting gate, track a bag, explain when ConnectionSaver is holding a flight, and let a passenger seek an earlier standby seat. United says more than 85 percent of its customers use the app on travel day.

Delta has become more conservative as United has become more aggressive. Its recent international route reveal was what first made the difference in pace feel obvious to me. Detroit–Athens and Boston–Venice are useful additions. But two routes in the September announcement, even with three announced earlier for summer 2027, felt small beside United's ten new cities.

The onboard product is where the stagnation is most frustrating. A customer paying for Delta One can still get a 767-300 with a dated business-class seat. Delta is selling a premium brand across aircraft that deliver very different experiences.

The complaints go beyond seats. A Delta customer compared an $8,000-plus Delta One trip unfavorably with a $2,500 Air France trip, criticizing the food and wine. Steve Sinofsky described United's transformation and Delta's decline. These are the customers United now has an opportunity to win.

Delta’s widebody delivery schedule stretches its fleet renewal over years, leaving customers flying the older cabins in the meantime.

I wrote this week about Delta One at LAX: a separate entrance, private security, and a lounge with a restaurant, showers, and a terrace. I want that same quality once I get on the plane.

Delta still makes the most money among the U.S. airlines: Delta reported $5.0 billion in GAAP net income for 2025. American Express paid it $8.2 billion that year, up 11 percent. Reliability remains a strength too: it was Cirium's most on-time North American airline in 2025, for the fifth consecutive year.

But loyalty has become more expensive. SkyMiles qualification now centers on spending, and lounge access has more restrictions. Customers being asked to spend more have reasons to expect a better trip. United's improvements are making the comparison harder for Delta.

Delta has free Wi-Fi on nearly 1,300 aircraft, according to its figures cited by Business Insider. That's a substantial achievement, and many more planes than United's current Starlink fleet.

But United said it had Starlink on more than 560 aircraft by mid-September. Delta's Amazon Leo installations don't begin until 2028. United can invite a customer to try its new system now, while Delta is explaining why its next one is worth waiting for.

Musk made the timing difference public. United’s status match gives Delta’s frequent flyers a way to try Starlink without giving up their elite benefits to switch.

Last week was a tipping point. Delta still has the profits, the loyalty business, and North America's most on-time operation. What it's missing is the urgency it had in 2006, when it was adding JFK routes while still in bankruptcy. I want to see that Delta again.